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1 Introduction
The effect of indebtedness on the external interest premium has been of great the-
oretical and empirical interest in international macroeconomics. On the empirical
side, the conditions under which countries can borrow from abroad differ greatly.
An obvious explanation is that markets assign different probabilities to default, ei-
ther sovereign or private. If default risk is positively correlated with the extent of
indebtedness, this creates a link between the level of debt and the external premium.
On the theoretical side, debt-dependent interest premia are introduced into open
economy macro models to induce stationarity on the one hand, and as a simple stand-
in for financial frictions on international capital markets on the other hand. Since
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), a positive debt elasticity of the external interest
rate is a regular feature of small open economy models.
The exact relationship between measures of indebtedness and external interest
rates, however, remains elusive. Macroeconomic models where a debt-dependent
interest rate was introduced to guarantee stationarity, starting with Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003), tended to use a small value for the elasticity parameter. Estimated
DSGE models tended to find larger values, such as Garc´ıa-Cicco, Pancrazzi and
Uribe (2010). In these latter models the debt dependent interest rate stands in for
financial frictions, which helps explain the dynamics of consumption and the trade
balance.
Another strand of the literature tried to uncover whether the relationship be-
tween the external interest premium and indebtedness is nonlinear. In a model of
the global financial crisis of 2009-2010, Benczu´r and Ko´nya (2016) assume a Linex
specification, and show that this is important to match quantitatively the differ-
2
ent experience of four Central-Eastern European economies (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. A recent con-
tribution to the empirical literature on potential non-linearity is Brzoza-Brzezina
and Kotlowski (2016). The paper estimates a regime switching regression, where
the regimes are linked to the extent of external indebtedness. Findings indicate
that the interest premium - debt relationship is indeed non-linear in their sample,
and non-linearity becomes important when the net foreign asset (NFA) - GDP ratio
reaches about -70-75%.
In this paper we revisit the empirical findings and qualify them in a number
of ways. Our main question is the following: is the debt-premium relationship
state-dependent? The topic is partly motivated by discussions of a global financial
cycle (Rey, 2013; Passari and Rey, 2015), which posits that financing conditions of
individual countries vary with the global appetite for risk. It is reasonable to expect
that the debt-premium relationship varies with global - or possibly regional or even
local - conditions. The already mentioned work of Benczu´r and Ko´nya (2016) model
the financial crisis as a permanent shift in the premium function. The debt-premium
relationship may also depend on the level of economic development. In general, the
level of sustainable debt relative to GDP is considered lower in emerging countries
than in advanced economies. This may be a result of lower trust in the economic
policies followed by the former group. Therefore, we also test for state dependence
with respect to relative GDP per capita.
Our findings indicate that the debt-premium relationship is indeed state depen-
dent. The relationship is much stronger during crisis times, and its strength also
decreases with the level of economic development. We find some evidence of non-
linearity, but primarily during crisis times. In terms of macroeconomic modeling,
our results are consistent with regime switching frameworks (see for example Blagov,
2018), where tranquil and turbulent periods alternate and are accompanied by dif-
ferent debt-premium functional relationships. After presenting the baseline results
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we run a number of robustness checks where we vary the sample, the measure of
debt, and the definition of crisis events.
Besides Brzoza-Brzezina and Kotlowski (2016), our work is most closely related
to Dell’Erba, Hausmann and Panizza (2013). These authors estimate the relation-
ship between sovereign spreads and government debt. Similarly to our work, they
look at differences across emerging and advanced economies, and across turbulent
and tranquil times. In addition, they study whether the currency composition of
external debt matters for the spreads. In general, they find state dependence similar
to our results.
Our work extends and compliments Brzoza-Brzezina and Kotlowski (2016, BK
henceforth) and Dell’Erba, Hausmann and Panizza (2013, DHP henceforth) in a
number of ways. First, we use a much broader sample than either of these papers.
We mostly add less developed countries and a longer time period - our sample
starts in 1980 and ends in 2017. Second, we combine the approaches in the two
papers, and look both for state dependence and non-linearity. Third, in contrast to
DHP, we use interest rates on long government bonds to measure sovereign spreads
instead of EMBI spreads (their measure for emerging economies). This allows us
to work with a much longer sample period. Also, over time the EMBI measure
became less relevant for emerging countries, because they are increasingly able to
borrow in their own currencies, and the EMBI only tracks dollar-denominated bonds.
This casts some doubt on results that use this index as a measure of the relevant
spread.1 The disadvantage of using bond yields, on the other hand, is that we cannot
control for the currency of issuance - we return to this issue later. Forth, we add
number of additional specifications. We look at a much broader set of crisis events,
compare different measures of indebtedness (the net foreign asset position and gross
government debt), and discuss potential sample selection problems.
Our paper is also related to the work on the determinants of emerging econ-
1https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2007/02/22/bye-bye-embi
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omy bond spreads. Ag˘ca and Celasun (2012) use firm-loan level data to estimate
determinants on yield spread for the private sector. They find that there are sig-
nificant spillovers from external public debt and private spreads, but they find no
relationship between domestic public debt and spreads. This supports our use of
the overall net foreign asset position as the main measure of aggregate indebted-
ness. Similarly to DHP, Comelli (2012) also uses the EMBI spread as a measure
of the interest premium, and focuses on emerging markets. He also finds that the
debt-premium relationship depends on global economic conditions. In contrast to
our paper, however, he does not include measures of indebtedness as an explanatory
variable. Csonto´ (2014) studies the interactions between global financial conditions
and country-level fundamentals, also focusing on emerging economies.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss our sample and some mea-
surement issues in Section 2. Next we turn to our baseline results, including tests
of state dependence and non-linearity in Section 3. Then we present a number of
robustness exercises in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Measurement
Our full sample consists of an annual unbalanced panel data for 89 advanced, emerg-
ing and developing countries between 1980-2017. The unbalanced nature results
from limited availability of long term interest rate data for many countries in some -
typically the earlier - time periods. Only some advanced countries have continuous
interest rate coverage for most of the years. Others enter the sample later, and some
countries also experience gaps.
We make two additional adjustments to the sample we use for estimation. First,
we drop very small countries (with population on average below 1 million), based
on the assumption that their behavior is highly idiosyncratic. These countries are
Botswana, Cyprus, Fiji, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Samoa,
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Seychelles, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Second, we remove country-year obser-
vations where inflation is persistently high. We define such high inflation episodes
as ones where the five-year average inflation rate is above 10%, starting from the
year in question. The rational is that calculating the real interest rate is highly
unreliable in these cases, and when inflation is very high, ex-post real interest rates
- and hence interest premia - can easily be significantly negative, but it is unlikely
that this is due to favorable treatment by financial markets. We experimented with
other thresholds, and results are robust to the precise definition.
Our final, restricted sample is presented in Table 1. We believe that this sample is
appropriate for our analysis, as it includes a broad set of countries and time periods
that can be considered “normal” or “representative”. Note that even after we drop
small countries and high inflation observations, we still have many more countries
and periods than Brzoza-Brzezina and Kotlowski (2016) or Dell’Erba, Hausmann
and Panizza (2013). Our main results will be derived from this sample, but we
include robustness check for the original, full sample in a later section.
The two key variables that we need for the estimation are a measure of the interest
premium and a measure of external indebtedness. We follow Brzoza-Brzezina and
Kotlowski (2016) and use the net foreign asset position (NFA) over GDP ratio as our
main measure of debt, although later we report robustness results with the gross
debt position of the general government as in Dell’Erba, Hausmann and Panizza
(2013). For the interest rate, we use long government bond rates. The premium
is constructed as a difference of these rates and the long bond yield for the United
States. Ideally one would need bond yields in the same currency, preferably in US
dollars. Unfortunately data availability is very limited for such instruments. Also,
as we discussed earlier, dollar spread measures such as the EMBI are becoming
less representative of overall market sentiment. Therefore, we again follow BK and
include the inflation differential between a country and the United States as a right-
hand side variable to control for expected exchange rate movements. Our inflation
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Table 1: List of Countries
Country Period Country Sample
Armenia 2000-2017 Malaysia 1992-2017
Australia 1980-2017 Mali 2014
Austria 1980-2017 Mexico 2000-2017
Bangladesh 2006-2017 Moldova 2005-2017
Belgium 1980-2017 Mongolia 2013-2017
Benin 2015 Morocco 1997-2007, 2010-2017
Brazil 2007, 2010-2017 Myanmar 2010-2017
Bulgaria 2003-2017 Namibia 1994-2010, 2012
Burkina Faso 2012-2015 Nepal 1981, 1987, 1993-2017
Canada 1980-2017 Netherlands 1981, 1987-2017
Chile 2005-2017 New Zealand 1986-2017
China 2005-2017 Niger 2014-2015
Colombia 2003-2017 Norway 1985-2017
Costa Rica 2014-2016 Pakistan
1992, 1995-1998
2001-2004, 2011-2017
Cote d’Ivoire 2012-2013 Papua New Guinea 2005-2017
Czech Republic 2000-2017 Philippines 1994-2007, 2014
Denmark 1980-2017 Poland 2001-2017
Estonia 1997-2010 Portugal 1990-2017
Ethiopia 1986-1987, 1992-1997 Romania 2005-2017
Finland 1987-2017 Russia 2008-2017
France 1981-2017 Senegal 2012-2015
Germany 1980-2017 Singapore 1999-2017
Ghana 2009-2010 Slovakia 2000-2017
Greece 1993-2017 Slovenia 2002-2017
Honduras 1983-1986, 1999-2007 South Africa 1992-2017
Hungary 2000-2017 Spain 1983-2017
India 1981-1985, 1993-2017 Sri Lanka 2009-2017
Indonesia 2003-2017 Sweden 1981-2017
Ireland 1982-2017 Switzerland 1980-2017
Israel 1997-2017 Thailand 1999-2017
Italy 1983-2017 Togo 2012-2015
Jamaica 1997-1998 Trinidad and Tobago 1984-1993
Japan 1989-2017 Turkey 2010-2016
Korea 1981-2017 Uganda 2009
Kyrgyzstan 2009-2017 United Kingdom 1980-2017
Latvia 2001-2017 United States 1980-2017
Lithuania 2001-2017 Uruguay 2011-2017
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measure for year t is 5-year moving average between t and t+4. We use actual
observations when available. For years 2014-2017, when averaging takes us past the
sample period, we rely on inflation forecasts in the IMF World Economic Outlook.
We use the following set of independent variables, including the two just de-
scribed and additional controls.
1. Net Foreign Assets to GDP ratio.
• Data comes from two sources. The principal source is the updated dataset
described in Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2018, LMF henceforth), which con-
tains data until 2015. We add observations for 2016 and 2017 using the
IMF Balance of Payments statistics.
2. Long-term interest rate on government bonds.
• The principal data source is the IMF International Financial Statistics. In
a few cases, we augment this with observations from the OECD Statistics,
and Bloomberg.
3. General government gross debt to GDP ratio, current account, GDP (both
real, nominal and purchasing power parity), budget balance, inflation.
• The data source for these variables is the World Economic Outlook.
4. Foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratio.
• The main source is the LMF database, augmented with IFS for 2016-2017.
5. Exchange rate volatility.
(a) Data comes from the Bank for International Settlements and Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables.
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Mean St. Dev. Max Min Obs.
Interest premium 2.146107 3.635414 21.57917 -8.4025 1415
NFA per GDP -19.99817 52.62306 291.2693 -287.6144 1413
Inflation differential .9595672 2.267276 8.3874 -3.1658 1415
Exchange rate vol. .0214292 .0180795 .1166903 .0015733 1142
Current account -.4102185 5.910872 26.059 -36.06 1414
Gross govt. debt 56.31531 33.8201 236.388 3.664 1262
Gross govt. balance -2.381339 4.039235 18.434 -32.055 1293
GDP per capita (% US) .6788974 .4008001 1.862275 .0151885 1415
Reserves per GDP 12.78955 14.42479 113.1311 .0965307 1406
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
3 Empirical results
The regressions we run take the generic form given in equation (1):
yit = α + β1NFAit + γ
′xit + µi + ηt + it, (1)
where yit is the long-term interest rate premium of country i in time t, NFA is the
net foreign asset to GDP ratio, xit is a vector of various covariates, µi is a country
fixed effect, and ηt is a year fixed effect. This regression is similar to the preliminary
specification in BK, with the additional countries included in the sample and time
dummies added. Time dummies are important, since global financial conditions vary
over time, and this is likely to be reflected in country specific risk premia.
Our main goal is to investigate various sources of state dependence. Our main
questions are the following.
1. Is the NFA - premium relationship present in our sample, and if yes what is
the magnitude of the estimated parameter?
2. Does the presence of time dummies significantly change the result?
3. Is the debt-premium slope parameter time dependent? In particular, does it
increase in times of financial turbulance (i.e. crisis)?
4. Is the debt-premium relationship different for rich and emerging/developing
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countries?
In our baseline specification, we use a very simple definition of crisis episodes. We
simply assume that global financial markets were turbulent during the “long” global
financial crisis of 2008-2013, which includes the subsequent Euro crisis as well. This is
motivated to a large extent by data limitations: our coverage of emerging economies
is very patchy until 2000, whereas earlier crisis tended to concentrate among them.
Also, the global financial crisis affected all countries to varying degrees, while earlier
events - such as the East Asian crisis starting in 1997 - were geographically more
limited. In a robustness exercise later, we present results with alternative crisis
definitions as well.
3.1 Baseline results
We estimate equation (1) with various controls included. The baseline results are
reported in Table 3, and our additional findings are reported in Table 4. The tables
are split so that we first present results comparable to earlier findings, and then we
turn to testing state dependence in the debt-premium relationship.
The first column in Table 3 is the simple linear specification, where the nominal
interest premium is regressed on the lagged NFA-GDP ratio with only the 5-year
inflation differential relative to the US as a control variable. We also include country
fixed effects in all the specification. The second column adds additional controls:
GDP per capita relative to the US, the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, the
current account, central bank reserves and the budget balance as percentages of
GDP. The third column includes year dummies, to control for general changes in
the global appetite for risk.
The results show that the level of indebtedness has a significant, but fairly modest
impact on the interest rate premium. A 10 percentage point deterioration in the
NFA-GDP ratio leads to a 8.36-11.6 basis point increase in the interest premium,
depending on the specification. This range is higher than the original calibration
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Table 3: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged NFA/GDP -0.0116*** -0.00984*** -0.00836***
[0.00252] [0.00261] [0.00241]
Infl. diff. 0.341*** 0.345*** 0.310***
[0.0486] [0.0601] [0.0619]
Relative GDP -3.354*** -5.734***
[1.262] [1.210]
NEER volatility 19.33*** 15.92***
[4.173] [4.127]
Current acc. 0.0334** 0.0542***
[0.0157] [0.0145]
Reserves 0.00874 0.00197
[0.00872] [0.00807]
Budget bal. -0.173*** -0.0795***
[0.0193] [0.0207]
NFA x Crisis
NFA squared
NFA squared x Crisis
NFA x Rel. GDP
NFA x Crisis x Rel. GDP
Constant 1.529*** 2.506*** 4.424***
[0.0940] [0.858] [1.090]
Country FE yes yes yes
Year FE no no yes
Observations 1,352 1,013 1,013
R squared 0.043 0.145 0.333
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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used in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), but in line with estimated DSGE models
such as Jakab and Ko´nya (2015) and also very similar to the coefficient in BK. The
coefficients on the other controls are mostly as expected, although the positive sign
on the current account might indicate reverse causality, if troubled countries are
switching to current account surpluses to improve their balance sheets.
Time dummies are important, and change the estimated coefficient significantly
(it drops by about one-third). The explanatory power of the regression doubles
relative to the regression with the same controls, but without time dummies. Figure
1 plots the year dummy coefficients, which are also instructive on their own right. We
can see that global financial conditions - captured by the interest premium relative to
the US - do vary over time. Most importantly, the estimation identifies the general
decline in premia over the 1990s and 2000s until the financial crisis. As expected,
the global premium component starts rising from 2007, and peaks in 2012. This
latter finding might be driven by the fact that we have many European countries in
the sample, and there was a secondary crisis in the Euro area between 2011-2013.
Figure 1: Time dummies in the baseline specification
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Table 4 turns to the question of state dependence in the debt-premium relation-
ship. We look for two such possibilities. In the first column we add an interaction
term between the NFA - GDP ratio and the crisis dummy, defined to be 1 during the
broadly interpreted global financial crisis of 2008-2013. We later report robustness
check with different crisis definitions.
Controlling for the financial crisis is important. While still significant, the coef-
ficient is now lower in tranquil times. The coefficient in crisis times, on the other
hand, is almost twice as high as the average estimated earlier (column [3] above).
That the crisis interaction is highly significant and quantitatively dominant implies
that the debt-premium relationship is mostly driven by turbulent periods.
The second column tests for non-linearity. On its own, the quadratic term is not
significant. While this is a cruder approach than the regime-switching regression in
BK, our findings indicate that non-linearity is not a general feature. In fact, even
the linear term becomes almost insignificant during normal times. When we interact
the quadratic term with the crisis dummy, however, we get a significant coefficient,
along with the crisis dummy itself. For a country that has no debt (NFA/GDP = 0),
the marginal effect is −0.004 in normal times, and equals −0.017 in crisis times. For
a country with an NFA/GDP position equal to -50%, the marginal effect is the same
in normal times, but becomes −0.22 in crisis times. This means that a further 10%
decline in the NFA-GDP ratio would lead to a 2 percentage point increase in the
interest premium. This may be unreasonably high and could be further refined by
a more sophisticated definition of non-linearity. Nevertheless, the general message
is that potentially strong non-linearity appears only in turbulent periods.
The second form of state dependence we test for considers relative development.
We ask whether countries with lower GDP per capita relative to the United States
face a steeper debt-premium relationship. Column (6) in Table 4 shows that this is
indeed the case. First, the interaction term is highly significant and quantitatively
large. For a country with the same GDP per capita as the US, the interest premium
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Table 4: State dependence
(4) (5) (6)
Lagged NFA/GDP -0.00662*** -0.00436* -0.0204***
[0.00244] [0.00249] [0.00591]
Infl. diff. 0.344*** 0.364*** 0.384***
[0.0621] [0.0618] [0.0621]
Relative GDP -5.171*** -5.486*** -5.268***
[1.212] [1.203] [1.208]
NEER volatility 15.51*** 13.99*** 14.74***
[4.100] [4.076] [4.068]
Current acc. 0.0585*** 0.0608*** 0.0635***
[0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0144]
Reserves 0.00473 0.00236 0.00731
[0.00805] [0.00800] [0.00819]
Budget bal. -0.0715*** -0.0723*** -0.0837***
[0.0207] [0.0205] [0.0207]
NFA x Crisis -0.00824*** -0.0113*** -0.0213***
[0.00224] [0.00235] [0.00540]
NFA squared 9.45e-06
[1.35e-05]
NFA squared x Crisis 8.11e-05***
[1.90e-05]
NFA x Rel. GDP 0.0139***
[0.00506]
NFA x Crisis x Rel. GDP 0.0129***
[0.00464]
Constant 3.982*** 4.179*** 3.644***
[1.090] [1.081] [1.095]
Country FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013
R squared 0.337 0.35 0.352
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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is−0.0204+1×0.0139 = −0.0065. For a country whose GDP per capita is 50% of the
US level, the premium is −0.0204 + 0.5× 0.0145 = −0.0135. Relative development
matters even more in crisis periods. In turbulent times, the coefficient on NFA/GDP
is (−0.0204 − 0.0213) + 1 × (0.0139 + 0.0129) = −0.0149 for the hypothetical rich
country, and (−0.0204− 0.0213) + 0.5× (0.0139 + 0.0129) = −0.283 for the poorer
economy.
These results are consistent with a “safe haven” interpretation. During times
of international financial problems, investors tend to seek safe assets, such as US
treasuries, German bunds and other rich country bonds. As the appetite for risk
declines, financial markets are particularly weary to invest into less developed, highly
indebted economies. This drives up the interest premium for such countries more
than for rich economies. A caveat to these results is that our crisis identification
primarily comes from the global financial crisis, when these issues were particularly
prevalent. We return to this issue in the next section.
4 Robustness
4.1 Full sample
Table 5 presents results for the full sample, where we include both small countries
and high inflation episodes. The four columns include the baseline specifications
with controls, and the tests of state dependence and non-linearity that we discussed
in the previous section for the preferred sample. In general the results are much
weaker, and the coefficients are often insignificant. The NFA/GDP coefficient is
about one-third of what we found in the restricted sample. The crisis dummy and
the crisis interaction are small and insignificant, although they have the expected
sign. Relative GDP and its interaction with indebtedness are still significant, and
the estimated coefficients are similar to the previous results.
An indication that this sample is not suitable for analysis is the extremely small
15
Table 5: State dependence
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged NFA/GDP -0.00380** -0.00366* -0.00528** -0.0159***
[0.00155] [0.00202] [0.00233] [0.00483]
Infl. diff. -0.000521** -0.000522** -0.000508** -0.000485**
[0.000227] [0.000227] [0.000227] [0.000228]
Relative GDP -7.591*** -7.575*** -7.443*** -7.492***
[1.371] [1.380] [1.382] [1.380]
NEER volatility 27.58*** 27.57*** 27.81*** 27.39***
[3.509] [3.514] [3.515] [3.502]
Current acc. 0.0380*** 0.0381*** 0.0392*** 0.0374***
[0.0143] [0.0143] [0.0144] [0.0144]
Reserves -0.0169** -0.0170** -0.0133 -0.0139*
[0.00799] [0.00803] [0.00830] [0.00820]
Budget bal. -0.0298 -0.0296 -0.0279 -0.0378*
[0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0212]
NFA x Crisis -0.000220 -0.00261 -0.00432
[0.00200] [0.00241] [0.00578]
NFA squared -1.06e-06
[8.55e-06]
NFA squared x Crisis -8.59e-06
[8.38e-06]
NFA x Rel. GDP 0.0116***
[0.00402]
NFA x Crisis x Rel. GDP 0.00523
[0.00523]
Constant 6.986*** 6.980*** 6.830*** 6.669***
[1.188] [1.191] [1.193] [1.194]
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204
R squared 0.276 0.276 0.278 0.283
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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- but significantly negative - coefficient on the inflation differential variable. We
include this variable to proxy for the fact that the interest rates are for instruments
in different currencies. Uncovered interest parity (UIP) implies that inflation dif-
ferences should be fully reflected in the nominal interest rates. In the restricted
sample the estimated coefficient is around one-third. This is consistent with general
empirical findings that UIP is often violated in the short run, but tends to hold more
in the long run (Chinn and Quayyum, 2012). We find it very unlikely that inflation
differences are unrelated to nominal interest premia. The more likely explanation is
that ex-post inflation differences are a poor proxy for expected real interest rates in
a high inflation environment.
4.2 Gross debt
There are different measures of external indebtedness. In many open economy macro
models there is no distinction between public and private sector debt on the one
hand, and debt instruments and direct investment on the other hand. In models
where all these are perfect substitutes the NFA position is the appropriate analogue
in the data.
Nevertheless, one can argue that NFA is not the right empirical measure of
overall indebtedness. While FDI stocks lead to sustained outflows of income, they
cannot be quickly withdrawn, and hence are not typically associated with external
financial stress. Another issue concerns gross vs. net measures. As Rey (2013)
argues, small net positions might obscure large gross exposures. When renewing
debt, the relevant variable for financial markets may well be gross indebtedness and
not the net position. Table 6 therefore contains results for the case when we use
the gross debt position of the general government (relative to GDP) as our external
debt measure. We use the same baseline sample as for our main results, although
we need to drop additional observations due to the lack of gross debt data.
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Table 6: State dependence
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged gross debt 0.00898** 0.00377 -0.0254*** 0.0173*
[0.00371] [0.00383] [0.00791] [0.00988]
Infl. diff. 0.201*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.243***
[0.0590] [0.0584] [0.0578] [0.0580]
Relative GDP -2.784** -2.591** -2.012 -0.214
[1.289] [1.275] [1.271] [1.604]
NEER volatility 18.40*** 17.15*** 15.74*** 16.88***
[4.177] [4.137] [4.119] [4.086]
Current acc. 0.0415*** 0.0432*** 0.0500*** 0.0475***
[0.0146] [0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0143]
Reserves -0.00257 -0.00134 -0.00488 -0.000471
[0.00801] [0.00792] [0.00791] [0.00778]
Budget bal. -0.0798*** -0.0774*** -0.0776*** -0.103***
[0.0212] [0.0210] [0.0208] [0.0233]
GDebt x Crisis 0.0156*** 0.0286*** 0.0440***
[0.00336] [0.00810] [0.00616]
Gdebt squared 0.000150***
[3.54e-05]
GDebt squared x Crisis -8.62e-05**
[4.04e-05]
GDebt x Rel. GDP -0.0169
[0.0116]
GDebt x Crisis x Rel. GDP -0.0309***
[0.00571]
Constant 2.154* 2.284* 2.697** 0.325
[1.226] [1.212] [1.204] [1.410]
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 969 969 969 969
R squared 0.324 0.341 0.354 0.365
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The results are very similar to the main specification2 The main difference is
that state dependence and non-linearities are even stronger. The crisis interaction
coefficient is roughly twice as high than under the baseline. The negative coefficient
on gross debt in column (9) may look puzzling, but together with the quadratic term
the marginal effect is positive once gross debt is larger than 13% of GDP.
4.3 Sample composition
Table 1 makes it clear that the sample composition varies significantly over time. The
sample size, given our restrictions on population size and inflation, is 9 countries in
1980, 22 countries in 1990, 39 countries in 2000 and 57 countries in 2010. Moreover,
the early sample is dominated by relatively rich countries, while most of the emerging
economies enter systematically only after 2000. Therefore, as a robustness check,
we report results that focus on the post-2000 period, which has the broadest set of
countries. Another advantage is that this period had only one major international
crisis event, the global financial crisis of 2009-2013.
Table 7 presents results for the post-2000 sample. The results are again very
similar to the baseline specification, with some minor differences. The crisis inter-
action remain highly significant, but the coefficient is less pronounced (specification
[12]). State dependence in the form of relative development is stronger than in
the baseline, but does not significantly change during the crisis. Overall, the main
conclusions remain robust.
4.4 Crisis episodes
Our baseline specification used a very simple definition of crisis periods. We assumed
that all countries in the sample faced turbulence between 2009-2013, and all other
periods were tranquil. As a robustness check, we now use the crisis timing in Laeven
2The difference in signs comes from the fact that indebtedness means a negative NFA and a
positive gross debt position.
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Table 7: State dependence
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Lagged NFA/GDP -0.0123*** -0.0107*** -0.00837*** -0.0387***
[0.00310] [0.00313] [0.00319] [0.00692]
Infl. diff. -0.274*** -0.224*** -0.208** -0.183**
[0.0819] [0.0834] [0.0837] [0.0823]
Relative GDP -6.479*** -5.588*** -5.916*** -5.603***
[1.576] [1.599] [1.591] [1.573]
NEER volatility 11.48** 11.49** 9.912** 12.06**
[5.035] [5.007] [4.987] [4.924]
Current acc. -0.0100 -0.00469 -0.00150 0.000499
[0.0177] [0.0177] [0.0178] [0.0178]
Reserves -0.00891 -0.00800 -0.00892 -0.00177
[0.00908] [0.00903] [0.00898] [0.00896]
Budget bal. -0.0718** -0.0596** -0.0569** -0.0605**
[0.0290] [0.0292] [0.0290] [0.0290]
NFA x Crisis -0.00644*** -0.00869*** -0.0116**
[0.00230] [0.00244] [0.00541]
NFA squared 1.11e-05
[1.47e-05]
NFA squared x Crisis 6.35e-05***
[1.90e-05]
NFA x Rel. GDP 0.0272***
[0.00574]
NFA x Crisis x Rel. GDP 0.00608
[0.00464]
Constant 5.265*** 4.733*** 4.989*** 4.232***
[1.001] [1.014] [1.008] [1.008]
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 883 684 684 684
R squared 0.036 0.140 0.272 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Country Years Country Years
Angola 2015 Luxembourg 2008-2012
Austria 2008-2012 Malaysia 1997-1999
Belgium 2008-2012 Moldova 2014-2017
Brazil 2015 Myanmar 2012
Cyprus 2011-2015 Nepal 1984, 1988. 199
Czech Republic 2000 Netherlands 2008-2009
Denmark 2008-2009 New Zealand 1984
Ethiopia 1993 Norway 1991-1993
Finland 1991-1995 Philippines 1997-2001
France 2008-2009 Portugal 1983, 2008-2012
Germany 2008-2009 Russia 2000, 2008-2009, 2014
Ghana 2009, 2014 Slovakia 2000-2002, 2008-2012
Greece 2008-2012 South Africa 1984-1985, 1993, 2015
Honduras 1990, 1992 Spain
1980-1981, 1983,
2008-2012
Hungary 2008-2012 Sweden 1991-1995, 2008-2009
Iceland 2008-2012 Switzerland 2008-2009
Ireland 2008-2012 Thailand 1999-2000
Italy 1981, 2008-2009 Trinidad and Tobago 1986, 1989
Jamaica
1983, 1990-1991,
Uganda
1980-1981,
1996-1998 1988, 1993
Japan 1997-2001 United Kingdom 2007-2011
Korea 1997-1998 United States 1988, 2007-2011
Latvia 2008-2012 Venezuela 2002, 2010, 2017
Table 8: Crisis events from Laeven and Valencia (2018)
and Valencia (2018), and code a country-year cell a crisis event according to their
classification. A crisis event for a country occurs if there was a banking, currency, or
sovereign debt crisis as in Laeven and Valencia (2018). Alternative crisis definitions
are available in Eichengreen and Gupta (2018) or Cavallo, Powell, Pedemonte and
Tavella (2015). We work with the classification of Laeven and Valencia because of
its comprehensiveness.
Table 8 lists the various crisis events from Leaven and Valencia (2018) that
overlap with our baseline sample. The majority of the country-years observations
overlap with the global financial crisis, although the timing is somewhat different
from our previous assumption. There are additional crisis events such as the East
Asian crisis starting in 1997, and other episodes that affected individual countries.
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Table 9 presents the results with this alternative definition of crisis events. We
omit the basic regression without state-dependence or nonlinearity, since it is inde-
pendent of how we define crises. The results are again very similar to the baseline.
The NFA coefficient is much larger during turbulent years, now defined at the coun-
try level. There is evidence for significant nonlinearity, but only in crisis years. State
dependence is detected conditional on the level of development, and it becomes even
stronger during turbulent times. Overall, we conclude that while the precise coeffi-
cients depend on the crisis definition, there is very strong evidence for the kinds of
state dependence we were looking for.
5 Conclusion
The paper studied the relationship between measures of indebtedness and the inter-
est premium on government bonds. In particular, the main question was whether
such a relationship is dependent on time, the state of economy, and the types of coun-
tries studied. The answer is yes to all three questions. Whether we look at tranquil
of turbulent periods, and the relative development of the countries, all influence the
magnitude and significance of the debt-premium relationship.
The estimated elasticity is in line with both previous empirical work and es-
timates from DSGE models. Linear models, however, have to be calibrated such
that they take into account the type of the country (emerging or advanced) they
model. When the time period under study includes the global financial crisis (or
other important global events), regime switching models might need to be used.
There are empirical problems that arise mostly from the fact that data is patchy.
Ideally, one would like to use debt instruments denominated in the same currency.
Unfortunately widespread interest rate data is not available for such instruments.
Moreover, selection of both entry to international financial markets and the matu-
rity and denomination of debt may not be random. Nevertheless, we think that
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Table 9: State dependence
(15) (16) (17)
Lagged NFA/GDP -0.00554** -0.00522** -0.0197***
[0.00240] [0.00242] [0.00553]
Infl. diff. 0.346*** 0.369*** 0.384***
[0.0610] [0.0606] [0.0596]
Relative GDP -5.395*** -5.173*** -4.862***
[1.188] [1.176] [1.155]
NEER volatility 13.78*** 14.74*** 13.69***
[4.061] [4.025] [3.940]
Current acc. 0.0553*** 0.0588*** 0.0549***
[0.0142] [0.0142] [0.0138]
Reserves -0.00168 0.00184 0.00457
[0.00794] [0.00789] [0.00787]
Budget bal. -0.0557*** -0.0547*** -0.0837***
[0.0207] [0.0204] [0.0204]
NFA x Crisis -0.0207*** -0.00896** -0.0687***
[0.00336] [0.00419] [0.00776]
NFA squared 9.02e-06
[1.33e-05]
NFA squared x Crisis 0.000210***
[4.63e-05]
NFA x Rel. GDP 0.0130***
[0.00475]
NFA x Crisis x Rel. GDP 0.0699***
[0.00989]
Constant 4.332*** 4.043*** 3.400***
[1.069] [1.059] [1.052]
Country FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013
R squared 0.359 0.374 0.398
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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our study provides useful findings to understand the complex interactions between
indebtedness and the risk appetite of international financial markets.
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